China’s rapid rise on the global economic stage might have substantial and unequal employment effects in advanced industrialized democracies given China’s large volume of low-wage labor. In a new paper written together with Olaf van Vliet, we analyse the effects of Chinese trade competition across 17 sectors in 18 countries. We devote attention to a new channel, increased competition from China in foreign export markets. Our empirical findings reveal overall employment declines in sectors more exposed to Chinese imports. Furthermore, our results suggest that employment effects are not equally shared across skill levels, as the share of hours worked worsens for low-skilled workers.
In a new study published in Social Indicators Research, I explore with two colleagues developments and the drivers of earnings inequality at the sectoral level using an own database that is publicly available. The study examines three key explanations for increasing earnings inequality exploiting sectoral variation within countries over time—namely, globalisation, technological change and waning labour union power. Interestingly, the results provide only limited support for the argument that international trade leads to higher levels of earnings inequality. When we focus the analysis on trade with less developed countries we find a positive association between trade and earnings inequality. With regard to technological change, our findings provide mixed evidence for the hypothesis that skill-biased technological change increases earnings inequality. Our results bring back the waning country-wide labour union power as an important driver of earnings inequality. This corresponds with the fact that our sectoral data reveal a more general trend towards rising inequality across sectors over time.
Major donors heavily rely on GNI per capita to allocate development assistance for health. In our paper, we question this paradigm by analyzing the determinants of health outcomes using cross-sectional data from 99 countries in 2012. We use disability-adjusted life years (Group I) per capita as our main indicator for health outcomes. We consider four primary variables: GNI per capita, institutional capacity, individual poverty and the epidemiological surroundings. We construct a health poverty line of 10·89 international-$ per day, which measures the minimum level of income an individual needs to have access to basic healthcare. We take the contagious nature of communicable diseases into account, by estimating the extent to which the population health in neighboring countries (the epidemiological surroundings) affects health outcomes. We apply a spatial two-stage least-squares model to mitigate the risks of reverse causality, and use additional IV estimations as sensitivity tests. Overall we find that GNI is not a significant predictor of health outcomes once other factors are controlled for.
The US lags far behind its peers on delivering “inclusive” economic growth. Moreover, since certain developed countries manage to boost incomes for the rich as well as the poor, inequality isn’t an inevitable byproduct of globalization and technological change.
See my blog on Vox with Max Roser.
With inequality rising and household incomes across developed countries stagnating, accurate monitoring of living standards cannot be achieved by relying on GDP per capita alone. In this VoxEU column I analyse with colleagues Brian Nolan and Max Roser the path of divergence between household income and GDP per capita for 27 OECD countries. It finds several reasons why GDP per capita has outpaced median incomes. We recommend to assign median income a central place in official monitoring and assessment of living standards over time.
Divergence between the evolution of GDP per capita and the income of a ‘typical’ household as measured in household surveys is giving rise to a range of serious concerns, especially in the USA. In a new working paper with Brian Nolan and Max Roser, we investigate the extent of that divergence and the factors that contribute to it across 27 OECD countries, using data from OECD National Accounts and the Luxembourg Income Study. While GDP per capita has risen faster than median household income in most of these countries over the period these data cover, the size of that divergence varied very substantially, with the USA a clear outlier. Our paper distinguishes a number of factors contributing to such a divergence, and finds wide variation across countries in the impact of the various factors. Further, both the extent of that divergence and the role of the various contributory factors vary widely over time for most of the countries studied. These findings have serious implications for the monitoring and assessment of changes in household incomes and living standards over time.
Current advances in information technology have led to a significant substitution of routine work by capital. In a new working paper together with David Rueda we develop a simple theoretical framework in which individuals in routine task-intensive occupations prefer public insurance against the increased risk of future income loss resulting from automation. Moreover, we contend that this relation will be stronger for richer individuals who have more to lose from automation. We focus on the role of occupational elements of risk exposure and challenge some general interpretations of the determinants of redistribution preferences. We test the implications of our theoretical framework with survey data for 17 European countries between 2002 and 2012. We find vulnerability to automation to be more significant than other occupational risks emphasized in the literature.